



KOVETZ
**Heoros
Hatmimim
V'Anash**



Issue 1 (159)
Rosh Chodesh Adar



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KOVETZ

**HEOROS
HATMIMIM
V'ANASH**

~ Melbourne ~

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1 (159)

Dedicated to the Lubavitcher Rebbe

*Whose teachings and example are a
never-ending source of life for all mankind.
May we continue in his paths, and complete
the mission with which he has charged us:
To bring moshiach, and may it be right now.*



Dedicated to the hanhalah of
Yeshivah Gedolah,
May they see much Hatzlacha in their
Avodas hakodesh.



Dedicated to all the Shluchim of
Yeshiva Gedolah,
May they see much success in their
holy work, and succeed in their mission
that the Rebbe sent them here for.



Dedicated to all of the Bochorim in
Yeshivah Gedolah,
may they merit to fulfill their main
goal as Bochorim to learn Torah with
great diligence.



May we all merit to give the rebbe
much Nachas Ruach, and bring moshiach now.

Foreword

With joy and gratitude to Hashem, we are pleased to present the Kovetz "Heoros Hatmimim V'anash", issue 1 (159), a scholarly journal with original insights in all areas of Torah, Nigleh and Chassidus, Halacha and the Rebbe's Torah, compiled by the Shluchim to Yeshivah Gedolah, Melbourne.

The Kovetz is being printed in conjunction with the month of adar – month of joy, we are therefore printing a Kovetz of Torah thoughts, as Torah adds joy to one's life.

It is well known, that the Rebbe instructed Yeshivos and Anash across the globe, to periodically publish a Kovetz of Torah insights. With the object of strengthening and enforcing, the study of Torah amongst Anash and Tmimim. This notion is especially pertinent to the Yeshiva Gedola and Anash of Melbourne Australia, as per the Rebbe's instruction to the Shluchim time and again "Conquer Australia through the study of Torah".

May it be the will of Hashem, that our Torah and Mitzvos complete the Avodah of Dirah Betachtainim, and may we celebrate this month of adar together with our Rebbe and all the Rebbe'im with the arrival of Moshiach immediately.

The Editors

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Chassidus

The meaning of '*Arich Anpin*'

Hatomim Hashliach Shmuly Kesslman

Shliach in Yeshiva Gedolah

The Maamar *b'shaa shehikdimu* 5672 (the first of the famous Hemshech Ayin Beis) writes: "Adam Kadmon", "the preceding man" is called the "Arich" (Rotzon) for everything that follows. In simpler words, the Kabbalistic term Adam Kadmon, is a reference to Hashem's desire for all the worlds. Interestingly, Kabbalah/Chassidus, uses the terminology, "Arich Anpin" (long faces) to refer to the Rotzon for all the worlds, and "Ze'er Anpin" (small faces) in reference to the actual Sefiros of Hashem in Atzilus. What is the meaning behind this nuance, that the Rotzon for worlds, is "large", and the Sefiros the way they actually exist in Atzilus, are called "small"?

Let us refer back to the analogy of a person. The capabilities of a person are limited in their capacity. One can only run as fast as his feet can move, one can only lift objects that are light enough for him, one can only understand matters that are within his realm, etc. However, the **desire** to run, carry or understand has no limitation. A person can want to run to the moon and back in less than five minutes. There is nothing that can hold back what he can want. Rotzon, does not need to function based on the regular guidelines of people and their issues. So too with Hashem and his Sefiros, the Rotzon that he has for each trait is unlimited, unlike the powers themselves that are subject to the limitation of definition.

Now let's go even deeper: With regards to Hashem and his Rotzon vs Sefiros, it's not only that the desire for the powers is unlimited. Rather, the powers/Sefiros are actually contained in the Rotzon, in an unlimited fashion.

As explained before, Hashem's desire for his Sefiros, actually creates them. Therefore, the logic dictates, that on the level of Rotzon, where he has the desire for knowledge (for example), he automatically creates the power of unlimited knowledge. Using the aforementioned analogy, if Hashem would want to run to the moon and back in five minutes, he actually would have that ability, on the level of Rotzon. However, practically, his powers are not solely initiated by Rotzon, and therefore at the end of the day, in Atzilus, they are defined (small).

With this in mind, we can understand an idea mentioned in numerous places in Chassidus. In our Rosh Hashona Davvening, we say, "וכל קומה לפניך תשתחוה", "every upstanding being, bows before you (Hashem)". Chassidus defines this "bowing", as referring to the nullification of all existences at the level of Adam Kadmon.

Being that Adam Kadmon, is the stage where the Sefiros are invented purely by Rotzon alone, with no ulterior forces. Therefore, at that stage the entire value of the Sefiros, is solely, that the Rotzon wanted them to be. There is no other driving force keeping them in existence other than the Rotzon itself. Therefore, they all appreciate that their own being, is solely dependant on one force, they are most "humbled" and "bow", before that force.



The Effect of **ספירות** on the Rest of the **תורה**

Same as above

The maamar *b'shaa shehikdimu* 5672 (the first of the famous Hemshech Ayin Beis) writes “Chesed is the beginning of the revelation of the Sefiros” and is the gateway through which all Sefiros pass. What is the meaning behind that statement, and why is it so?

This idea applies on two levels, 1. Any expression or display of feeling or emotion from one person to another, is only meaningful and complete when the relationship is already founded on Chesed i.e. connection. For example, when two people share a tight bond of friendship, and at some point, during the relationship, one of them ignores the other for an extended period, the partner will be most offended and hurt. Being that the attribute of Gevurah/severity was employed, from one to the other. However, if two random people ignore and show a cold shoulder to each other, feelings of resentment and hate will not be delivered across. Only when one of the individuals, values and appreciates the other (Chesed/connection), is there a catalyst for other emotions to be expressed and experienced.

2. Let us employ the analogy of a young child who seeks attention. Children crave feelings of love and connection and will therefore see to do what they can, to elicit those feelings in an adult figure. However, at times, if the child sees that the connection he so desires is not being actualized, he may seek attention through negative behaviour. The question begs, why would the child enjoy an angry and annoyed response from an older personality? The answer being obvious, any sort of response in the child's eyes is a victory, because a connection and display of emotion is being transferred. Thus, we see, in the analogue, that any sort of exchange between one being and another, is

only meaningful if precluded by Chesed. And secondly, every exchange is really an expression of connection/Chesed.



Malchus is primarily gevurah

Same as above

The above mentioned Maamar states: The Sefirah of Malchus/kingship is primarily built by the attribute of Gevurah/severity. What is the meaning behind that statement, and why is it so?

Let us compare Malchus with other Sefiros: When the Sefirah of Chesed is at work, kindness and pleasantries will be exchanged and delivered from one individual to another. When the Sefirah of Tiferes is at work, feelings and emotions of pride and dignity will be exchanged and revealed. Or on a more external scale, a rich man gives riches, and a clever professor gives others knowledge and understanding. I.e every attribute or personality type, gives others, the trait that it contains and excels at.

However, a king does not give kingdom to others, he does not give other's feelings of rulership or control, and he does not give his subjects power and rulership. In fact, it is quite the opposite, a king gives his subjects, feelings of servitude and devotedness. A king does not allow his subjects to feel the superiority and exaltedness that he experiences.

The king employs decrees and rules, specifically of the nature that the people cannot understand. The reason being: specifically, in that way, where the common folk are blindly following the orders of an authority, can there be a functional society. Were everyone to be in

positions of power and decision-making, chaos would erupt. Meaning to say, the king's success is dependent and founded on his ability, to give his subjects a lack of connection with him and his ideas.

Therefore, we can now understand, why Malchus is "built" by Gevurah. Being that Gevurah, is the attribute of restraint and hiding of self, from the receiver. Specifically, when the Gevurah is in place, can a healthy rulership and leader, be of national benefit.



The hidden and revealed world's

Hatomim Ari Raskin

Student in Yeshiva Gedolah

One day Pappus bar yehudah found Rabbi Akiva sitting in a public place teaching and studying Torah to a group of students. Fearing for the great Rabbi Akiva's life, Pappas asked the master, "Are you not afraid of the Roman government?"

Rabbi Akiva replied with a parable:

'Once, a fox was walking hungrily alongside a river looking for his next meal when he saw a group of beautifully fat fish swimming in schools just out of his reach.

The fox called out to the fish, 'What are you fleeing from?' The fish answered, 'We're trying to avoid the nets that fishermen cast out to catch us.'

Slyly, the fox said, 'I know of another stream across the woods where there are no fishermen, and I would gladly carry you there, so you can continue safely on your way.'

The fish weren't fooled by the sky fox and replied, 'Aren't you the one known as the cleverest of all the animals? You aren't so clever after all! If we're in danger here in the water, which is our home, how much more so would be in danger on your back and out of the water!

We may wonder, why did ר' עקיבא & פפוס have Such opposite approaches as to how to deal with the decree? Also, why did ר' עקיבא find it necessary to reply with משל a of fish in water, couldn't he have just said that תורה is his life, which is why he couldn't abandon it?

To understand this story, we must first analyse the Difference between עלמא דאתגליא - The revealed world & עלמא דאתכסיא - The concealed world:

Generally, we apply ג"עדותא to the world of בריאה, and ס"עדאתא to the worlds יצירה & עשי. The reason why the world of בריאה is the world of concealment can be understood as follows. When one is driving and there are high beams shining into his eyes, not only will it fail to lighten up the road ahead, but it will blind him making it impossible for him to see anything. So, in the world of בריאה where there is intense G-dly light shining, it covers over all the creations causing them to be concealed and hidden from the lower worlds.

This can be better understood through the following 2 משלים:

1. דיבור in contrast to מחשבה the way they are in אותיות.

(Note: אור in this משל refers to an emotional or intellectual concept)

If you try to identify what language you are currently thinking in or what were the last few words you had thought, it will take you a few moments to come up with the result.

The reason for that is the words in your thought are subtler and more refined, which allows the concept that is being contemplated to shine much more. Due to the intensity of the אור, the actual words are covered up, and only the actual content behind them can be recognised. Therefore, it is possible to be contemplating a theory for a full day without anyone knowing what you're thinking, because the actual words are concealed.

In contrast to speech where the words are much more recognisable causing them to be heard and understood by others. The reason is because the words in your speech are more defined and take up more space themselves, allowing much less אור to enter. Therefore, when

speaking (unlike in your thought), your word choice plays a big role. Due to the lack of אור, the actual words in your speech are more apparent, hence being revealed to others. This idea is expressed clearly in a situation where someone has a strong emotion or intellectual idea which he can sense in his mind but struggles to convey in words. What truly is happening, is, the words in his mind are allowing the strong emotion or intellect to enter and be expressed. Unlike the words in the speech, they block out most of the emotion or intellect.

The נמשל is the same idea, all you have to do is trade the 'Words' for the 'Creations'. Let's go through it:

In the concealed worlds (Words in Thought), the creations are more subtle and refined (בטל), therefore they can accept much more G-dly light, and due to the intensity of the light, their existence becomes covered and concealed.

In contrast to the revealed worlds (Word of speech) where the creations feel to be much more of an existence (יש), less G-dly light is able to shine, and due to the lack of אור not all gets covered over, the creations themselves are then revealed.

2. A creature on land in contrast to being in the sea:

A Creature of the sea, a fish, by definition is found in the water, it is impossible for the fish to survive anywhere else. The fish never has to make the decision to stay in the water. Rather, its very existence is totally United with the water and it subconsciously feels that it cannot be separated from it. The reason for that is, because the fish and its source of life are one, meaning: the fish is completely בטל to its source and doesn't feel like an independent being. This idea is expressed when you enter a pet store to buy a fish, when the fish is being taken out of the large tank to be placed in a smaller container, it is not necessary to remind the staff member to take some water along with the fish, by

default the very definition of fish equals water. Therefore, when paying for the fish, they will not charge you for the water separately, because it is part of the fish you are buying.

In contrast to purchasing a dog, everything purchased in addition to the dog (Cage, food etc.) is an additional expense. The reason for that being, creatures of the land whose life source is the ground (that is where all food comes from), feel like an existence of their own independent from the land. That's why it is possible for creatures of the land to exist in the water while going for a swim, or to be in the air, like a bird flying for example, it's possible for them to forget that they receive their life force from the ground. Only when they are hungry again do they remind themselves what their source of life is and return to land for food.

So too in the נמשל: The fish in the sea can be compared to כ"עדאת , and the creatures on the land could be compared to ג"עדאת .

Like in the sea, the creatures are covered by their life source (the water), and not only can't they detach themselves from it, but it won't even enter their mind, as their existence and their source are one. So, to in the concealed worlds, the creations are completely covered by their life source (G-dlines), and they cannot detach themselves from it. Their whole being and existence is the G-dly light which gives them life.

Unlike in the revealed world, the creations don't constantly sense that they need to get life from their source. They feel like independent beings (like creations on the land), which is why we see that some people can go long periods without Torah - their life source, forgetting they need that they need חיות.

To summarise: Revealed worlds = Words of speech = Creatures on land = Less light shining = Further from source.

Concealed worlds = Words in thought = Creatures in the sea = More light shining = Closer to source.

Perhaps we can even say that these two משלים complement each other. Had we just said the משל of the 'words' you may have thought: The reason why the words in thought can contain more light, (which causes them to be concealed), is because the words themselves are בטל. But had you made those very words more of a יש, they would block out some light and you would be able to reveal them as recognisable words as in your speech. So too vice-versa, if you made the words of speech more בטל, they would contain more Light which would conceal over the words making them like words in your thought. However, the משל of the 'Sea and Land' tells you that it is not so. Taking words of thought and putting them into the speech is like taking a fish, who is בטל and therefore one with its source (Water), and putting it on the land (away from its source) hoping it will adjust and become a creature of the land. Not only will this not work but the fish will die. And vice versa, taking words of speech and putting them into your thought, is like putting a dog who is not בטל and therefore feels like a separate existence from its source, and burying it in the land (Making it one with its source). Not only will the dog not become more connected with its life source, rather it will die.

This is so, by the נמשל as well:

The creations of the concealed worlds don't just find themselves to be בטל which causes them to be one with their life source (G-dlines). Because if that was the case, all that has to happen would be to remove them from their source, and they would immediately become more of an existence and feel like a separate entity from their source (like the creations of the revealed worlds). Rather they are intrinsically one and totally unified with their source. Hence if you tried removing them from their source, not only wouldn't it work, but they would die.

So back to the story of Rabbi Akivah:

Poppus, like the most of us, lived like a world of תאג"ג. So it wasn't entirely obvious to him that his existence is dependent on his source of life (Torah), he managed to separate the 2 things. However, Rabbi Akivah who was a Tzadik, since he live in ת"כ"ג he didn't even think twice about what to do, he knew that if he left Torah, it would be suicide, he'd cease to exist.

And therefore, he gave the Moshol of the fish in the sea. He was comparing Poppus to the fox, a creature of the land who was able to think of himself as an existence separate from its source. However, a fish, who's existence is one with its source and doesn't even need to remind himself to stay in the water, so too Rabbi Akivah was so united with his source of life (Torah) that it would be even enter his mind to leave its ways, even for a moment.



The Mechanics of Rotzon

Hatomim Nochie Wolf

Student in Yeshiva Gedolah

What is Rotzon?

Rotzon, the will of a person is the purest expression of himself. Unlike actions resulting from other human faculties which would express the person based on the way he interacts with external variables such as intellect and emotions, an action based on rotzon will be fully objective- "Because that's what I want".

Due to the uniqueness of rotzon, its interactions with the other aspects of the person express this idea. And by understanding these interactions we will have a better understanding of what rotzon is.

Rotzon and Limbs:

Let's first introduce the way the chayus (energy of the limb) interacts with the limbs of a person. The chayus and the limbs share a reciprocal partnership, where on one hand the chayus gives energy and ability to the otherwise lifeless limb and at the same time the chayus independently is just a potential, and for its abilities to be actualised it must be encloded in a limb. So the chayus is affecting the limb and the limb is also impacting the chayus.

However, rotzon collaborates with the limbs differently. Rotzon is the primary influencer in the movement of a person, and really all activity is stems from rotzon. However, the rotzon is not impacted by the state (e.g. strength or health) of the limb, for example;

(A)if someone has a rotzon to learn a maamar but he is tired and can't focus, even though he ultimately doesn't learn the maamar

nonetheless his rotzon remains unchanged. So rotzon is completely impervious to the capacity of the limbs.

(B) Another example for the way rotzon interacts with the limbs is, that if the limbs can't naturally accomplish a certain act (e.g. jump over a wall) but nonetheless the person has a rotzon to, his rotzon will enable him to complete the act.

Rotzon and Intellect

A rotzon of a person is far beyond the realm of intellect and very often the logical approach to do something will contradict the rotzon. For example, if a person has a rotzon to receive one hundred dollars and he was consequently given ninety-nine dollars, according to the logical conclusion he should be satisfied ninety-nine percent but since it was a rotzon to receive one-hundred dollars he won't be satisfied at all until he completes the full hundred.

However, we do see that rotzon profoundly impacts intellect;

(A) For example, if there is a decision to adjudicate between two equal parties but the judge has a rotzon for one particular side to win, his logic in the decision will be disposed towards that side because the rotzon causes the logic of the judge to perceive his 'rotzon team' as deserving.

(B) Additionally, there is a famous rule "one should always learn in a place where his heart desires" because if he has a rotzon to learn, his achievements will transcend his natural capabilities. So we see here too that rotzon is not affected by what intellect dictates.

But why?

Based on all the above it is clear that rotzon is a major authority in controlling a person's behaviour but nonetheless it dictates the activity

on its own terms not the rules of the particular medium it's using. How and why can rotzon do this?

Let's give a moshol, there is a boss who instructs his worker to do something that is not normal for this worker to do. When the boss instructs he doesn't think about the capabilities, dignity or desire of the worker, rather since he wants something to get done the worker in his eyes is just an intermediate to complete the job. This is because at the stage when he desires, he is only concerned about his want and therefore doesn't consider the nature of his worker.

Similarly, by rotzon, since it is an extension of the nefesh (soul) - it is a powerful and unadulterated display of the person's essence and therefore it does not 'know about' the other faculties of a person (as they aren't relevant to the way the person works on 'essence-level'). The entire objective of the rotzon is to get something done (similar to the boss). Therefore, when the rotzon is the cause for a particular action the result is beyond the restrictions presented by that medium as the rotzon doesn't regard the tool it's using. (Not meaning to say that it's a selfish ability rather, it just 'doesn't know' about the other faculties as it's so beyond).

Solution

So now let's go back to the 2 paradoxes that rotzon presents, the limbs and the intellect;

Limbs:

a) Since the rotzon is independent of the limb and isn't influenced by it, the rotzon will remain unchanging even though the limb is failing.

b) Since the rotzon wants to achieve something through the limbs (i.e. move) it doesn't acknowledge the limitations of the limb and it can, therefore, accomplish exceedingly more than the limb 'thinks it can'.

Intellect:

a) Since the rotzon is far beyond the way a person behaves intellectually, even though the rules of intellect would rule that the verdict can go either way the rotzon manipulates the intellect to choose one side.

b) The way rotzon impacts a person to be able to learn more than he would without the rotzon is more similar to the way rotzon transcends the limbs to achieve something (limbs part b). It is similar in the sense that the rotzon doesn't recognize the restrictions of the person's natural intellectual ability and can surpass that.

Conclusion:

So in summary, since the rotzon is a completely pure expression of the person, far beyond the way he relates to the world through his intellectual and emotional faculties it surpasses the nature and restrictions of the particular tools it uses to express itself. And therefore we see how the rotzon isn't affected by the nature of the tool it is accomplishing through, whether that be the limbs of the body or (the rules of) intellect.



NIGLEH

The meaning of *destroying Chametz*, According to Rashi and Tosfos

Hatomim Hashliach Shneur Schapiro

Shliach in Yeshiva Gedolah

The gemara (4B) tells us that according to torah law one who needs to destroy his chametz can suffice with *nullifying* it, and it was the chachamim who obligated us to also search for the chametz.

Rashi and tosfos have different explanations how to define this *nullification*:

Rashi says it means that you shall give it no importance in your heart (and consider it like the dust on the ground). And that is also considered as if you destroyed it. By doing so you have fulfilled the mitzvah of destroying chamets.

Tosfos on the other hand explains, that the idea of nullifying it is that through doing so you are making it "hefker" - free for all to take, thereby disowning it and (as an outcome) excluding yourself from the obligation of destroying it [however through doing so you didn't fulfill the mitzvah of destroying chamets], and only actually destroying it would be fulfilling the mitzvah.

It is clear from tosfos that he does not agree with rashi, that the idea of nullification is that through doing so the chamets is now considered non existent (but rather that it has merely been made *hefker* and not considered his). this would explain why tosfos doesn't write that through nullification you fulfilled the obligation of destroying chamets, being that the chamets still exists according to (tosfos' opinion of the)

halacha, and has not been destroyed, obviously you didn't fulfill the obligation of destroying it.

The obvious question is what is the cause for the dispute between rashi and tosfos, if nullifying chametz is considered destroying it or not?

Maybe we can explain that rashi and tosfos have two ways to understand the prohibition of owning chametz and they therefore argue on how one must get rid of it.

The problem of owning chamets can be understood in two ways:

1) the torah prohibits a **person** to own chametz. 2) the torah prohibits that the **chametz** should be owned on pesach.

Meaning: is the issue with owning chametz that torah does not want a active/conscious connection between a person and chametz on pesach. Or is the issue the actual owning of chametz, that under any circumstance a person may not own chametz on pesach.

These two ways will also affect what one needs to do to *destroy it* i.e. can one just nullify it or does he need to actually destroy it. if the issue is the conscious connection it has with the **person**, meaning its importance in one's eyes, then one can suffice with nullifying it in his heart, being that now it has no importance to the person at all. If however the **chametz** can't be owned then one (can't just nullify it, but) will need to actually destroy it, and get it out of his property.

Based on this we can explain the dispute between rashi and tosfos.

Rashi understands the prohibition of owning chametz to be a prohibition for a **person** to own chametz, he therefore says that one can fulfill his obligation by just nullifying it as explained above.

Tosfos however understands it to be forbidden that the chametz be owned, and will therefore not suffice with the owner's nullification, and obligates him to actually destroy his chametz. the meaning of *destroying chametz*, According to Rashi and Tosfos.



Destroying Chamets from Chatzos on Erev Pesach

Hatomim Hashliach Yanky Hacoheh Blasberg

Shliach in Yeshiva Gedolah

The Gemara (5a) states during a discussion about the source for the obligation to burn Chametz at midday on the 14th of nisan: *Rava said*: The halacha that leaven is prohibited from midday on the fourteenth of Nisan is derived from here: “*You shall not slaughter the blood of My offering over leavened bread*” etc. (Exodus 34:25). This verse means that *you shall not slaughter the Paschal lamb while your leavened bread is still intact*. In other words, all leaven must be removed before the time the Paschal lamb may be slaughtered.

Rashi comments: “The time of slaughter for the Paschal lamb is from the beginning of the 7th hour” etc. Then he quotes a Gemora from *Yuma* that speaks about the prayer of Avraham that begins when the walls blacken and that the time of the korban Tamid is derived from there, the Gemora then asks: but we see that the Korban Tamid is slaughtered a half hour later? It then answers that the walls of the Beis Hamikdosh were different and only darkened a half hour later after midday.

You may ask, Rashi is known to be very precise, why then does Rashi write so at length quoting a Gemora etc? Seemingly all that is necessary for our Gemora is the fact that Korban Pesach is at midday, with that information we can now derive for the prohibition of Chametz on the 14th, why then does Rashi bring the Gemara in *Yuma*?

We can understand this with taking a look at Tosfos: “The Rashba asks how can you derive from the Pesach lamb that the prohibition of the Chametz starts from the 6th hour, if the Pesach lamb was only slaughtered after the tamid which only starts at the 7th hour”?

Meaning, inevitably the Pesach lamb only got slaughtered some time after the 7th hour so why would Chametz be prohibited immediately from the 7th? Tosfos then answer: since *be-di-aved* if you slaughtered the Pesach lamb Before the Tamid it would be fine, therefore the official time is the 7th.

Maybe Rashi had a similar problem to this: we see that that the pesach was not done right away?

In Order to answer this question Rashi writes so a length.

By bringing the Gemara from *Yuma* which states, that the Korban Tamid was slaughtered a half hour later, and that is only because of special circumstances in the Beis Hamikdosh was the time delayed, but ideally the time began earlier, Rashi is telling us that so too the Pesach lamb, even though it was delayed, ideally the time began at the beginning of the 7th.

Now Rava can learn the prohibition of chametz and the time of the prohibition is at the beginning of the 7th hour.



Feeding chametz to *Hefker* dogs

Hatomim Hashliach Simcha shneur

Shliach in Yeshiva Gedolah

Rashi writes (5B dibur hamaschil shma mina), that one of the options of destroying chametz after it had already become forbidden is *giving it to dogs*.

Rashi is of course speaking about **public** dogs, being that if you would give it to your own dog you would derive pleasure, by saving money on buying food for your dog, and one may not derive **any pleasure** from chamets on pesach.

This rashi however is puzzling, because the yerushalmi (chapter 2 halacha 2) says that *it is forbidden to give chamets even to a public dog*, and the *lavush* (448, 6) explains, that the reason is because *one derives pleasure from supporting feeding an animal even if its hefker*. if so why does rashi permit giving chamets to a public dog, if there is some pleasure derived?

Rashi's opinion can be understood based on rashi's definition of the prohibition of deriving pleasure from chamets. rashi writes (21B, lo yochal) that the biblical prohibition of deriving pleasure from chamets is because *all pleasures have a monetary value which can be used toward buying food, and torah forbids deriving any pleasure from chametz*, and therefore all pleasure from chamets is forbidden.

Based on this we can explain that only pleasure with a **monetary value** will be forbidden on pesach biblically, however pleasure with no monetary value will not be forbidden on pesach biblically. the prohibition of pleasure from chamets with no monetary value is merely a rabbinic decree, to assure our safe distance from the chamets.

Based on this we can say, that rashi is of the opinion that the prohibition of deriving pleasure from feeding a public dog (as mentioned above from the yerushalmi), is merely a rabbinic decree, being that there is no monetary value gained by feeding a public dog.

This will explain why rashi suggests feeding chamets to a public dog as a means of destroying chamets. being that there is a **biblical** obligation to destroy the chamets, that will be strong enough to override the **rabbinic** prohibition of feeding it to a public dog. and thereby adding another option of how to destroy chamets.



Staying away from Hekdesh

Hatomim Ari Raskin

Student in Yeshiva Gedolah

The gemara (6a) discusses the concern that one will see חמץ which will lead him to eat it on Pesach. רבא then comments that this concern doesn't apply to חמץ which was made הקדש (- donated to the beis hamikdash), since מבדל בדילי מיניה - a person will distance himself from it, there is no concern that he will come to eat it. Rashi explains the distinction between חמץ and הקדש is: חמץ is always allowed and even on פסח, it is only forbidden 8 days a year, therefore you do not naturally distance yourself from it. In contrast to הקדש which is always אסור even during non פסח days, therefore you do naturally distance yourself from it and you won't come to eat it.

Seemingly this distinction is not valid, as just like regular חמץ, it is possible that this item as of yesterday was not הקדש. It could've been made הקדש any Given day, till that point in time it was permitted and not distant from you. So, what essentially changed now that it is הקדש? It seems to be the same as חמץ which was allowed Yesterday, Erev Pesach.

Possibly you could answer, based on the תוס' רבינו פרץ in the beginning of the מסכתא, which explains the difference between חמץ and יין נסך regarding מיניה בדילי. Although both could have been allowed previously, Even Yesterday, yet unlike חמץ, the יין נסך מבדל שם - בדלי מיניה - the 'concept' of יין נסך makes you stay far away. We aren't discussing the physical bread or wine, rather the theory of it. If on a regular day of the year you hear 'חמץ' it won't bother you at all, you may even run to eat it. Unlike 'יין נסך', when you hear these words you become very cautious and stay away.

So too in our case. Rashi is saying that the theory of שוקד food is distant from you the whole year, unlike חמץ which was never an issue until now.



Moshiach And Geulah

The teshuva of Tzadikim in the Times of Moshiach

Hatomim Hashliach Ahron Dovid Rapport

Shliach in Yeshiva Gedolah

The alter rebbe writes in likkutei torah (לקו"ת שמע"צ צב, ב) based on the zohar that when moshiach comes the tzadikim will do teshuva.

The obvious question is what does it mean that tzadikim will do teshuva if they have no sins to do teshuva for?

The answer is, that it does not mean they will do teshuva for their sins, rather that they will merit the unique advantage of a baal teshuvah's service of hashem, also in their service of hashem.

The explanation is:

A baal teshuva has 5 unique advantages in his service of hashem.

The immense **emotional connection** that a baal tashuva has, and the thirst that he has to connect to hashem. For being that he has been so distanced from hashem his emptiness causes him to have a great thirst to hashem, just as one is thirsty for water in a desert.

The **pleasure on-high** from his service to hashem, being that he was so distanced from hashem so when he reconnects it causes a great pleasure on-high. Just as a father which connects to his son after being disconnected for a long time.

The **uniqueness** of his service to hashem, being that when he serves hashem he changes himself over in an extreme (abe-normal)

manner, this causes a great pleasure by hashem. Just as the nature of the human that rare things bring joy for e.g. a parrot which attracts people when it speaks.

The **type** of kelipah **elevation** which a baal teshuva causes, being that when a baal teshuva feels bad about his state in his service of hashem, he has inner remorse and regret, which is not being caused or aroused by others. meaning that the **negativity itself** feels the need to change.

The **level** of kelipah **elevated** by a baal teshuva, for being that a baal teshuva was connected with *shalosh kelipos hatmeios - the three impure kelipos*, because of the sins he did, and then that itself (i. e. the distance from hashem) arouses/causes him to do teshuva, that elevates the g-dly sparks which were stuck in the lowest places, and reconnects them to holiness.

Now, the cause for tzadikim getting the advantages of baalei teshuva when moshiach comes is because, when moshiach comes the g-dly revelation will be so great that in comparison to its immense greatness they to will fill distant and far from hashem, and will therefore want to connect to him

Which now clarifies which of the baal teshuvahs advantages they will merit. They will merit the first advantage - the thirst for g-dliness, because they to will now fill distanced from hashem being that now they see how far they are in comparison to the greatness of hashem. They will (seemingly) have the third advantage - the uniqueness of a renewal/change in their service of hashem being that they will now become incomparably closer to hashem. And they will have the fourth advantage - that the low one himself feels the need to elevate himself "being that they will be considered sinners" in comparison to the revelation of hashem's greatness.

[however they will not have the advantage of pleasure caused when a distant child comes close, being that hashem's revelation didn't distance them from hashem more than they were before (just that they feel that way).

Similarly they will not have the fifth advantage - of elevating the lowest kelipah, being that they still have no connection with kelipa and negativity].

The rebbe however has a different and amazing way to understand the teshuva of tzadikim when moshiach will come. Which will b"h be printed in the next kovets heoros.

Way we merit moshiach's coming now mamash.



Mitzvos - When Moshiach Comes

Hatomim Nochie Wolf

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In the “קונטרס הלכות של תורה שבעל פה שאינם בטלין לעולם” the Rebbe discusses the eternity of the laws of the Torah and in particular the status of mitzvos in the times of Moshiach.

The Rebbe poses the following question; There is a general rule that Torah is eternal and will last forever similarly, the Rambam states in the end of Hilchos Megillah that “All laws in the Oral Torah will not become nullified when Moshiach comes”. However in Meseches Nidah (61B), Rav Yosef permits burying a corpse in shrouds of kilayim (a forbidden mixture of material), even though when he arises by Techiyas Hameisim he will be transgressing a prohibition from the Torah, because Rav Yosef says that “The commandments (mitzvos) of the Torah will be nullified when Moshiach comes”, so at that time the prohibition won't apply! So seemingly this is in direct contradiction to the rule of the eternity of Torah and the Rambam's previous statement that “All laws in the oral Torah will not become nullified when Moshiach comes!”

The Rebbe answers with a revolutionary way of learning the rule “The commandments (mitzvos) of the Torah will be nullified when Moshiach comes”. The Rebbe explains that a command is a tool to convey a message to someone else who is separate from you and therefore needs to be informed of what you want. But to tell yourself something obviously doesn't require a commandment.

Likewise, when Moshiach arrives, a Jew's innate bond with Hashem will be revealed, consequently negating his personal sense of self-existence and he will feel that he and Hashem are one complete existence. Therefore there will be no need for a mitzvah-

commandment to instruct the Jew to fulfill Hashem's will, rather the mitzvos-will of Hashem will be our reality and their fulfillment will therefore be automatic (in the same way that a person doesn't require a commandment for himself).

But the existence of the essence of Torah and the will of Hashem (what Hashem wants) will exist just as it does now, and this is the meaning of "All laws in the oral Torah will not become nullified when Moshiach comes", that the existence of the laws as laws (i.e. expressions of Hashem's will) and not as a commandment will remain .

And therefore we permit a person to be buried in forbidden shrouds because the commandment of kilayim will not exist when he arises. The Rebbe also adds that the shrouds, will miraculously cease to exist because they contradict the existence of the Jew and Hashem, since they are against the will of Hashem and therefore can not possibly exist at a time when the will of Hashem is the only reality.

However the Ritvah on that piece of Gemara seems to give a very similar answer! He says that when we say that "the commandments (mitzvos) of the Torah will be nullified when Moshiach comes" it means that we won't be commanded to fulfill them, but due to our recognition of their beauty we will continue to keep them. So what is the the rebbe adding to the answer of the Ritvah?

The key difference between the answer of the Rebbe and the Ritvah is what will be the relationship shared between the mitzvos and the Jew fulfilling them in the times of Moshiach. The Ritvah says that the Jew fulfilling the mitzvos is doing so because he 'feels like it' and it comes as a result of his own acknowledgement of their significance. But theoretically in an instance that he doesn't have this feeling there will be no necessity for him to do the Mitzvah since he is not obligated to do it. So there is no essential connection that the Jew shares with the mitzvah-the will of Hashem.

However according to the Rebbe's explanation, the entire idea of nullifying the commandment is because the Jew has an essential connection to the mitzvah since he and Hashem's will are one and it's therefore impossible for him not to do the mitzvah. Therefore the Jew will be one complete existence with Hashem and will do all the mitzvos automatically. Unlike the Ritvah who says that there is no feeling of compulsion to fulfill the Mitzvah.

May we merit to come to the time when our intrinsic connection to Hashem is revealed and all commandments will be nullified with the coming of Moshiach speedily.



Halacha

Drinking the wine of kiddush

One of the Bochorim

The *mechaber* in shulchan aruch (271: 14) writes that “it is the best way to fulfill the mitzva of kiddush if all of those listening to kiddush taste from the wine”. And the gr”a there writes that the source for this halacha is from pesachim 106 B.

The gemara there tells a story that rav ashi once came to the city *mechuza*, where they told him to make the “great kiddush”, not being sure what to do he said the blessing on wine - borei pri hagafen, when an old man bent down and drank the wine...”. this gemara (according to the gr”a) indicates that all those listening to kiddush should also drink from the wine.

On this however there are two obvious questions:

1) how do we know that this old man did so because that was the halacha maybe it was a one time occurrence?

2) in this case the old man only did so to show rav ashi what the meaning of the “great kiddush” is, and therefore un-necessarily was this his conduct always?

Maybe we can answer this based on how the rosh explains the gemara. The rosh explains that it was the norm for everyone to stick out their cups to get some wine from kiddush, and the old man in our gemara stuck out his cup the first.

Based on this we can explain how this gemara is a proof that everyone should taste from the kiddush wine, for as the Rosh explains

that this story was an example of the custom that everyone would stick their cups out to get some wine and then drink it.



The Power of Tefillah in Lashon Hakodesh

A collection of sources

Tmimim Pinchas Shizgal and Shaya Swerdlov

Students in Yeshiva Gedolah

In **לשון** שלחן ערוך (ס"ק ס"א) it states that it's better to daven in **לשון** הקודש, but if you don't understand the meaning of what you are saying (עם הארץ), then even if you can pronounce the words properly in **לשון** הקודש, it is better to daven in English, even when davening **ביחיד** where one should **לכתחילה** daven in **לה"ק**, if he does not understand the words then he can daven in the language he understands, the reason being it is better to **understand** (rather than just saying **לה"ק**).

The **סימן** - on **ספר חסידים** writes in the name of **מגן אברהם** in **ק"ה** it is better to Daven in the language you understand (like the **ח"ת** - **תק"ח** says) only if you are a real **ש"ר**, because a **ש"ר** will definitely daven with the proper **כוונה**, however if not he should daven in **לשון הקודש**.

From the reasons you should daven in **לה"ק** there are:

1. That's how **ה'** speaks to the **נביאים** like we see in **פרשת רמב-** **תשא**.

2. The **ל"ח** say that the world was created in **לה"ק**. From the **posuk** - **"לקחה זאת אשה כי מאיש לזאת יקרא"** - "to this you will call it **אשה** because from **איש** it was taken" [as we know that **חיה** was created from the body of **אדם**]: Meaning: the source of the name **אשה** (meaning **איש**), is not just like a word sourced and based on another word (as in other languages), rather the essence of the being of a woman is described in

מוקדש

לכ"ק אדמו"ר נשיא דורנו
יה"ר שירוזה נח"ר רב מבניו-התלמידים השלוחים,
בתוככי כלל התמימים ואנ"ש שיחיו
ונזכה לגאולה האמיתית והשלימה
ויוליכנו קוממיות לארצנו תיכף ומיד ממש



נדפס ע"י ולזכות
התלמידים השלוחים
ישראל יעקב הכהן שיחי' בלסברג
שמואל שיחי' גורארי'
ישראל ארי' ליב שיחי' וואגעל
ברוך צבי הכהן שיחי' וואלף
ישעיהו מנחם מענדל שיחי' ליבעראוו
מנחם מענדל שיחי' סארקין
חיים ישראל שיחי' פייגעלשטאק
שמואל שיחי' קסלמן
אהרן דוד שיחי' ראפאפארט
מנחם מענדל שיחי' שישלער
משה שמחה שיחי' שניאור
שניאור זלמן שיחי' שפירא